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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
DALE PHILLIP TAYLOR, : Case No. 930784-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred in taking under advisement 
Appellant's motion to dismiss the Theft by Deception charge 
rather than ruling on it promptly, before requiring Appellant to 
present his case. 
Standard of Review: Appellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the law is for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 232, Utah Adv. Rep., 3, 4 (Utah 1994); State v. 
Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993) see Kennecott Corp. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993). 
II. Whether the prosecutor's questioning of Appellant on cross 
examination was improper and requires reversal. 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a mixed question 
of law and fact. "[A]11 applications of law to findings 
of fact that produce conclusions of law are reviewed 
under a nondeferential standard, i.e., for correctness." 
State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1994), State 
v.Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional 
provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules are contained in 
Addendum A. 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV 
Utah State Const. Art. 1 § 7 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 05 (1953 as amended) 
Rules 
Utah R.Crim.P. 17 (o) (1993) 
Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a) (1993) 
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) (1993) 
Utah R. Evid. 611(b) (1993) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. 
Appellant was found guilty by a jury on September 29, 1993 
and was sentenced on October 29, 1993 to a term of zero to five 
years at the Utah State Prison. The prison term was suspended 
and Appellant was placed on probation. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed November 26, 1993. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 21, 1993, Appellant went into Fankhouser Jewelry 
which is owned and operated by Miriam Davis and her husband, (R. 
274, 279, 324, 378). Appellant testified at trial that he 
brought two rings into the store seeking appraisals on both, (R. 
378-79). He also testified that Mrs. Davis took both rings into 
the back of the store for up to ten minutes, (R. 379-80). 
Appellant testified further that when Mrs. Davis returned, she 
told him that one ring was worth about $ 4,000.00, and she 
offered to buy it from him for $ 2,500.00 in cash or $ 3,000.00 
in trade and cash, (R. 380, 382). 
Mrs. Davis testified that Appellant came into the store and 
asked if she would be interested in buying a diamond ring that he 
had, (R. 280). She also testified that Appellant told her that 
the ring belonged to his wife, (R. 289). 
After examining the ring, Mrs. Davis gave Appellant, in 
exchange for the ring, a $ 750.00 watch, a $ 975.00 man's ring 
and a check made out for $ 1,275.00, (R. 284-86). She asked him 
not to cash the check until the next day, saying she was unsure 
if she had sufficient funds to cover the check, (R. 286-87) . 
Appellant left the store and went to her bank where he cashed the 
check after learning that her account did have sufficient funds 
to cover the check, (R. 294, 384-85). 
Approximately three hours after his first visit, Appellant 
returned to Fankhouser Jewelry because he was unable to properly 
set the watch he had been given, in part, for the ring, (R. 292, 
3 
325, 3 86). He was almost immediately confronted by Linda Davis, 
Mrs. Davis' daughter, who told him that they had discovered, 
after he had left the store earlier, that the stone in the ring 
he sold them was a cubic zirconium rather than a diamond, (R. 
325, 387). She demanded that Appellant immediately return the 
check, watch and ring he'd been given in exchange for the ring, 
(R. 330, 387-88). Appellant did not do so, and he left the store 
and headed to his car in the parking lot, followed by Ms. Davis, 
(R. 326,327, 329, 389-90). 
When Appellant arrived at his car, Ms. Davis was right 
behind him, (R. 33 0, 3 94). As he opened the car door, she tried 
to stop him from doing so, but he was able to get into the car 
and start it by putting the keys in the ignition, (R. 330, 395). 
Ms. Davis reached in through the open driver's side door, grabbed 
the keys, and turned the car off, (Id.). 
The testimony at trial of Appellant and Ms. Davis differed 
greatly regarding what happened next. Appellant testified that 
he started the car again and that Ms. Davis walked over to an 
area some distance away, (R. 397-98). He further stated that he 
backed up and drove out of the parking lot, never coming closer 
to Ms. Davis than approximately twenty feet, (R. 401). Ms. Davis 
testified that, after restarting the car, Appellant drove 
straight towards her, coming to within a foot or two of her; she 
said she had to jump out of the way to avoid being hit by the 
car, (R. 331). 
Appellant was charged with two offenses--Theft by Deception 
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and Aggravated Assault, "r -?.~* -* * >ie conclusion -f the 
C +- -3 |" rn ' r- ' ' g q p •- -p. f h : ri *- ^y-p-po "i I r5 ^  T rr.r^-xrriH f- W.- - v -i r. " - * -s -• i -v* •- * - -I-! p . H l l s S 
charge, for insufficiency of the evidence, - "••72;. The 
trial court- d^ .ri^ d l~ ne motion to dismiss with regard to the 
Aggravatec Assau:: -.narge, and took the m.nt-ion regarding the 
Theft" by Deception charge under advisement , requiring the defense 
Appellant Lestitied acout the racus ^^n'ounaiiig uat 
incidents which aa\ v ris- ' r - • charges * : 432 ) , After 
l-.hf ^ - -
charged against Api^jia:. •• . - :e /**: subsequently 
returned * *'* Courtroom nri advised * he "1 u^rt that they had 
i eac ,; ~- n 
the other «F - . i- -.* returned .:
 v : or, t.o 
cont1".1;^ del iberat"' ^^ - : r * Af^^r ---^ *-.~^ r 
delibei-i- . .*, .2 ^ - . - *-- - .t j1 foui id 
Appellant gui-ty c: Aggravated Assau. ^ere .:iai^ - t,o reach 
a verdict on the Theft by Deception charge (R , 13 6, 4 93, 4 95) . 
Defense counsel requested a rulina ant-'es motion to 
dismiss the Theft by Deception charge wr,: : h«- - . ,al court m e n 
c — i ^R. U D , 496, -o JM^—'T:- , . 
SUMMARY OF THU. AKoUJMK^T 
The Appellant was entitled to a promt* IU.I:,; on his motion 
waive his cla.n, k.\ . r.i^ LUv, ^^ ^J^JC^., .uuuc uLcx^ ui.tei .. O^ J-O.1 
judge took the motion under advisement. The trial court's 
failure to rule promptly on the motion constituted reversible 
error; the State did not establish a prima facie case of Theft by 
Deception which required the trial judge to dismiss the charge 
rather than requiring Defendant/Appellant to present evidence in 
his defense. Further, the trial court's error was prejudicial 
because it impacted the decision of the jury. 
The prosecutor's questioning of the Appellant on cross-
examination was improper and harmful. The failed to support his 
allegations in his cross-examination of Appellant with evidence, 
thereby calling improper matters to the juror's attention. The 
prosecutor's question asking Appellant to comment on the veracity 
of another witness' testimony was argumentative and sought 
information beyond Appellant's competence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TAKING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE THEFT BY DECEPTION CHARGE UNDER 
ADVISEMENT RATHER THAN RULING ON IT PROMPTLY. 
A. The trial court should have ruled promptly on Appellant's 
motion to dismiss. 
Appellant was entitled to a prompt ruling on his motion to 
dismiss the Theft by Deception charge, see State v. Emmett, 839 
P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). In Emmett, the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
[Utah Code Ann. § ] 77-17-3 clearly entitles the 
defendant to an immediate ruling on the sufficiency of 
the prosecution's case at the close of its case. The 
trial judge should at that time "rule promptly upon such 
a motion so that the defendant may decide whether or not 
to proceed with the introduction of evidence in his 
defense." The purpose of the rule is to "avoid forcing 
a defendant into going forward with his own evidence when 
the State's case is insufficient." 
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-.:o4"ina TTnited States v. Brown 4^^ F.2d 
--. » -*-I<L. 2 
L.Ea,2d bS4 
mu
-~ ^:se " h • -•• analoc-;^ *r Sta_L: JL.„-_ £ tt, 789 P. 2d 
.^ 'wu.. ~-*. Emmet t, i.. *_vjwir:^  :r-.- State 3 presentation 
•*\:" _ts case .. .hi-1. Emmetr. moved :c dismiss the charges •* 
reserved ;u^.... .<;, .-.*c inuiiuii uuix- :X J1Q.. a.. opportunity 
review fh- record rf •- " Emmett took the stand -^. i denied the 
tria.i nuaae a^smissea ;.- charge o: stx.,^„ -ii;u:rtr . : a c;iij.d c^a 
submitted •-he char*-3 of sodomy upon ^ •; - " *^ *-•••- -> * - / ;T,not ^  
entitiec t: a prcmi: ruling on his mo:: or.. runner, "viewea LV 
conjunction with tne prosecutor'^ ^prorp" irqument., thn fact 
that the evidence in favor of ax:, _rona. and ::he fact 
that these errors /mpacted Emmet* credibility n^.i character, 
|A| --,:- ~£ V-x :- ? • --• Emme,i:, t 
c o n c x d i e a ^:^.~ —.:. . . ^ . : , - - g ^ o c i ^ . .::. ^ i l i n c • . ..; omptly 
r u l e en **-)*- n / ' t i c n 'was ct s u f r i c j . e n t magn i tude a^ t o w a r r a n t a 
>~?'. a t . __v r _A .^ t"_.. ( ) 
-\stan" case, the trial court ruled . .\ Appellant's 
This ii^.ng c<*\..^>\ .•* considered prompt. .~s lit Emmett, •*., .ej xa.it 
did not waive his claim, and the error is reversible because the 
court forced the Appellant to present evidence in his defense 
even though the State failed to establish a prima facie case of 
the theft by deception charge against Appellant. Further, 
reversible error occurred here because the trial court's actions 
impacted the decision of the jury. 
B. The Trial Court should have dismissed the Theft by 
Deception charge because the State failed to establish a 
prima facie case. 
When a motion to dismiss a charge for insufficiency of the 
evidence is made, "the trial court should dismiss the charge if 
the State did not establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all of the 
elements of the crime charged.'" Emmett, 839 P.2d at 784 (quoting 
State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 534 (Utah 1983)). Here the State 
failed to present believable evidence regarding the element of 
intent to support a charge of theft by deception. "A person 
commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953 as amended). 'Deception' is defined in 
section 76-6-401(5); the applicable sections are as follows: 
'Deception' occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an 
impression of law or fact that is false and 
that the actor does not believe to be true and 
that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction; or 
8 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law 
or fact that the actor previously created or 
confirmed by words or conduct that is likely 
to affect the judgment of another and that the 
actor does not now believe to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another f roi i: t acquiring 
; nf ~;rmat: on likely to affect: hi s judgment :i i i 
transaction; or 
••-.'.-- c u c e u i o n must occur at t-hp fi'mp of
 ; transaction " 
State v. Noi- , :; -i ' i - - ": ,- ~ : - ;.ng State v, 
Droadj ' .n ±^o^ ' -la:-. ^aKey ' "*'» 
P. 2d lUo _ , .,1 >. . 
"; • ne instant case, the State failed to establish a prima 
fa • - r**^ I |pcppf 11 i ] jn i ige si i :::) 1 :i ] d 1: la < > e 
promptly ^.sniissea is charge IOI insufficiency of the evidence. 
Th.p State presentee insufficient pv.dence at trio r demonstrate 
impression oi fact, as t < * rie g e n t m e s s ot r,e i::.^ 
-/ *": ai v-'*' '->•- • •- -.-•=--*•.-. i - dir^^r examine ^-1" on that 
interested in buying a diamond ring mat, he had . , H 
further a:^~^ ,,^r* "onina m ^ ^ •^Grcn?." *~ ~- the following 
question. : e-j._-.rt-..:i^  I iat it: was a diamond? 
Did you assume- • = diamond, ;. i he say it was a 
diamond?", Mrs Davis testified that Appel lant said „u was a 
diamond ring t > I: 1 le had got f 1 on t hi s w :i f e " (1 1 1 
Mrs. Davis also testified that she has worked in the jewelry 
bi :i s:ii ness for for t} ! yea rs (R 27 3 ) ai id f01 twenty of those years 
she has been buying ai id selling diamonds (R. 2 ; ' 7) Mrs. Davis 
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testified .that she deals with diamonds on a daily basis, either 
buying, selling, or appraising them (R. 297), and that she has 
had training in the area of identifying gems and has attended 
various jewelry seminars (R. 278, 297). 
Mrs. Davis testified that Appellant brought in "a ring that 
is fourteen karat yellow gold band about six millimeters wide, 
had a finish on it, not bright and shiny, and had a karat size 
stone on it." (R. 280). Mrs. Davis stated that she looked at the 
stone, and measured it with a plastic gauge to determine the 
sized of the stone, according to millimeter size (R. 282). In 
looking at the stone, Mrs. Davis said its color was very good, 
"indicating that it was a better stone." (R. 283). After 
examining the stone thus far, Mrs. Davis testified that she 
"thought it was a diamond." (R. 284). 
On cross examination, Mrs. Davis testified that she examined 
the stone by looking at it with her naked eye, measuring it with 
both a plastic gauge with circles on it and a millimeter gauge, 
and by looking at it with an instrument called a ten power loop 
(R. 300-02). Mrs. Davis testified that she then made an offer to 
Appellant to purchase his ring which he accepted and then left 
the store (R. 284-87). 
Mrs. Davis testified that after Appellant left the store, 
she tested the stone twice with her diamond testing machine, and 
both times the machine indicated that the stone was not a genuine 
diamond (R. 287-88). The State brought the diamond tester to 
trial for demonstrative purposes, and Mrs. Davis used her own 
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diamond t •: demonstrate to the jury what the machine does when a 
genuine diamond -r "^uched * . z89-92) / se e Addendum C. 
The -i-.j _ . - . :..ioi. ., . . . .ant was rece/^G into 
evidence, ;• nterestingl\ -A . ~~ : !-• State had <%\ 
its disposal a machine that would show nidi the s* v 
ring was a zircon rather than a diamond, <^=> S^ a*"^  ci.a , .^ve 
Davis test this stone on the machine a: * . ;~ r ,169-.92. , 
i^ L^i. Ar? Davis, and her daughter L^da Davis, testified 
that Appel larr - - *-.< • . :ie store ahcur *r*--- hours later 
art 
exchange lor the r_,j:j neeaed an dd_ jstmen; ,5). At 
this time, Linda :;„ *i ^  rnH App^ila-" * '" - 'he riiij tney had 
The State called ot:i:er Roberts :> • • s; a: ; who testified 
that c h^ wrzac: dicpat^hed *• ^  *~h^  ^ ar^r');: ^'-r r^w°:? "-Te for "an 
asbc tr ^ H^ - -- - -si-mony 
concerned :r,e aggravated assau/ .allegations or;.
 ; she made no 
mention of the theft by deception allegatic— - • i: ""- -* \ 
question her regarding those allegation? .^- . 
The evidence presented by the State does not demonstrate 
that Arreilanu nau Liie required. lnteiiL una-. * ->' y 
Decep'w^wn statute a*- the time of 1-he transa:;^,., ; ,-t the 
evidence is tc the contrary .ere wa>- n. -mow!:.; that Appellant. 
djuaiiwria. ^ t u
 Fa^.:)S, : c i ) ^ o.. Mrs. Da • . „-. -r^perience with 
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diamonds and examination of this particular stone, believed at 
the time of the transaction that the stone was genuine. Mrs. 
Davis' testimony that the entire transaction--from the time 
Appellant entered the store until the time that he left--took 
twenty to twenty-five minutes (R. 3 06) demonstrates that in no 
way did Appellant prevent Mrs. Davis from acquiring information 
likely to affect her judgment in the transaction. Had Appellant 
intended to deceive the Davises by selling them a zircon rather 
than a diamond, he surely would not have returned to the scene of 
his alleged crime three hours later seeking an adjustment on his 
watch. 
C. The Trial Court's error in taking under advisement Appellant's 
motion to dismiss the Theft by Deception charge impacted the 
decision of the jury. 
The trial court's error is reversible because it impacted 
the jury's decision. The test used in determining when an error 
warrants reversal is whether, upon a review of the record as a 
whole, there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error a 
different result would have occurred. Emmett, 83 9 P.2d at 784; 
see e.g., State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 & n. 1 (Utah 1987); State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a). "[T]his 
determination is best made by viewing this error in conjunction 
with other errors that occurred during the trial, specifically, 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct." Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785; 
see Point II., infra at p. 17. 
Because the trial judge reserved ruling on Appellant's 
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motion l lismiss. Appellant was forced !;•- introduce evidence in 
his defense --*--• wa- -^ubjer^ed "-~- ^ ross -examination concerning the 
all'.-jcLL^ ] yr dL.-p. :. -;.e spent the major ity 
of ,.~:s cross-examination questioning Appellant with respect to 
the theft by deception c h a r ^ ; of trie Lwexiuy-ei":1 ! ra^? ct 
transcript containing the Sii^-'s cross-examinat ., ,.:.  Appelant, 
twenty-three pages focused solely or; : > meft bv :eception 
'I ne Jiduc o v_ J. .J 3 s - exam m a 11 on ±. mp dCLc .i A P uci J. ant' r* 
credibility and character which were centra] r; ' r.-:-.^  defense. 
! .1 u - ! • • - • 
dismiss under aav lsernent, -.; p e i i d M wouid ••• v nave been subject 
v."* cross-exam; na*~ :r • ~ >• , • cr.ara^ ar-'i !- -~ ^^edihi"! 11"1-- =?nd 
was a reasonable livelihood that absent r.r.-; error. different 
result would have occurred. 
Appellant's testimonv on rross-examination c a . r . ^ L t J with 
the testimony of Mrs Davis and Linda Davi s in several respects. 
Given the cor/ • • *-w-- ' :i mony • ::>:!l:: t ai 1 ::i tl i< = 
Davises, it ,-. .<_ _. ^  . iou_ . . .;_. ^ w;.ses to be - ~;^^^ is more 
likely they would b ?.. ieve that Appellant was i: * '-stifying 
test ity m o ^n; ^;.;,' .... t.v ^^ - uw ..-^,. u^ai^L ^ , w*^: / ^ •^^op-.-^n, 
;: - .ild h3\e easily believed as wv , 1 *:.r "appellant was not 
Mrs .-ctv . . ;st. ..ucu aeveidi times - ._:•,-_ na_ Appellant 
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had told her that the ring belonged to his wife, (R. 288, 289). 
The State questioned Appellant relentlessly on cross-examination 
regarding the origin of the ring, (R. 403-07); see Addendum D. 
In response to the State's questioning, Appellant repeatedly 
denied telling Mrs. Davis that the ring belonged to his wife, 
(Id.). Appellant had previously testified on direct that he had 
found the ring in a washing machine a couple days before he took 
it to Fankhouser Jewelry, (R. 3 75). The State had not brought 
this fact out in its case in chief, and it seized upon it on 
cross examination to show the jury that Appellant lied to Mrs. 
Davis when he told her it belonged to his wife, (R. 4 02-07); see 
Addendum D. Further, in closing argument, the prosecutor used 
this fact to destroy Appellant's credibility, stating: 
And in this case, we have a con. He misrepresented to 
start with that it was his own property. If you believe 
his version of the facts that he never said it was his 
wife's, or his ex-wife's, then manifested that it was his 
own property by saying give money for this, giving the 
impression that he has a right to the proceeds of that, 
that's not his property. That's a misrepresentation that 
he brought up. The State didn't bring it up at all. 
(R. 462) 
Mrs. Davis also testified several times on direct that 
Appellant represented to her that the ring he had with him 
contained a diamond, (R. 280, 284, 288) . Again, the State's cross-
examination of Appellant belabored him regarding this issue, and 
Appellant testified that he based his belief that the stone was a 
diamond on Mrs. Davis' offer and exchange of expensive merchandise 
for the ring, (R. 414-17); see Addendum D. Despite Appellant's 
testimony that he did not know the ring contained a zircon, the 
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prosecutor argued the following in his closing argument: 
What are the odds of two imitation rings being presented 
at the same time, and Defendant not knowing that either 
one on them was phony? That's one of the things you have 
to consider. What were the remaining misrepresentations? 
The ultimate one is creating the impression the ring was 
a diamond when he did not believe this to be true. 
(R. 463) 
On direct, Mrs. Davis testified that Appellant told her 
specifically that he wanted to sell the ring (R. 280, 284). On 
cross, Appellant testified that he went to the store because he 
sought appraisals on two rings, and he wanted to find out whether 
the ring contained a genuine diamond (R. 407, 412, 414). 
Mrs. Davis testified on direct that when she gave Appellant 
a check for $ 1,275.00 as partial payment for the ring, she asked 
him not to cash it until the next day because she did not think 
she had enough money in her account to cover the check (R. 287). 
She also stated that Appellant agreed to these terms (Id.), but 
that Appellant cashed the check the same day she gave it to him 
(R. 293) . On cross-examination, the State used this issue to 
shatter Appellant's character by making Appellant look like a bad 
person for cashing the check one day too soon (R. 419). The 
testimony was as follows: 
Q. Do you remember the instructions from Mrs. Davis telling you 
that there would not be money in the account until tomorrow; is 
that correct? 
A. She said that she had to make a deposit later that 
afternoon, or the next morning. 
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Q. And she asked you to wait; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you didn't wait, did you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Why didn't you? 
A. I wanted to see if the check was good. 
Q. Once you found out the check was good, and there was money 
in the account, why didn't you wait? 
A. If it would have been post-dated, I would have. 
Q. Did you think it might inconvenience her to have her checks 
bouncing because you took the check out before she said that you 
could? 
A. I did not force this woman to write a check. 
The prosecutor used this issue in closing argument to malign 
Appellant's character, saying: 
They told him not to cash the check until the next day. 
Now, I'm not sure what his reasoning was, or what people 
go through that reasoning of checking to see if 
somebody's reputable by going and trying to make them 
have all their checks bounce by getting your check in 
first. How that leads you to believe whether or not 
somebody is reputable or not when they say wait for the 
following day, I don't understands [sic] how this would. 
(R. 464) 
Appellant's character and credibility would not have 
suffered so severely had he not been subject to cross-examination 
on the theft by deception charge. If the jury believed Appellant 
was testifying untruthfully as to the theft by deception charge, 
they could have easily believed Appellant testified untruthfully 
as to both charges. Further, had only the aggravated assault 
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charge been submitted to the jury for deliberation, the jury may 
not have convicted Appellant of any crime at all. 
Review of this issue is appropriate because defense counsel 
properly preserved the issue for appeal. Defense counsel moved 
to dismiss both counts against Appellant at the close of the 
State's case in chief. The motions to dismiss preserved the 
issue for appeal, see Emmett. In Emmett, the court addressed 
this precise issue, stating: 
We have never required criminal defendants who have 
properly presented a claim to take exception to a trial 
court's erroneous ruling in order to preserve the issue 
for appeal. Rather, our case law establishes that the 
doctrine of waiver has application if defendants fail 
to raise claims at the appropriate time at the trial 
level, so the trial judge has a opportunity to rule on 
the issue, or if they do not create an adequate record 
for a appellate court to review their claims. 
789 P.2d at 783-84, (Utah 1992). 
POINT II. THE PROSECUTOR MADE IMPROPER AND HARMFUL STATEMENTS IN 
HIS CROSS EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT. 
The test used for determining whether a prosecutor's 
statements are improper and constitute error is whether the 
remarks "called to the jurors attention matters which they would 
not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict." Emmett, 
839 P.2d at 785; quoting State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 750, 754 
(Utah 1982) . Reversal is proper where statements are determined 
to be harmful. 839 P.2d at 785; (citations omitted). An error is 
harmful if it undermines the reviewing court's confidence in the 
verdict, or, stated alternatively, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome without the error, see 
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State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah App. 1993). 
Prosecutorial misconduct violates the defendant's right to due 
process of law guaranteed by amendments V and XIV of the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution. Further, it is the State's burden to show that the 
prosecutorial misconduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
see State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n. 21 (Utah 1986). 
A. The prosecutor did not support his allegations contained in 
his cross-examination of Appellant with evidence. 
In Appellant's case, the prosecutor failed to support 
prejudicial questions with appropriate evidence. During cross-
examination, the following exchange took place: 
Q. But you did intend to stay in the valley, and continue 
working; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But despite that, you immediately left for Washington after 
you had had this confrontation in the parking lot; is that 
correct? 
A. No. 
Q. You didn't immediately go back to Washington and pawn the 
ring and the watch in Seattle, Washington? Is that what you're 
saying here today under oath? 
A. I didn't go back immediately. 
Q. Well, how long did it take you to go back to Washington and 
pawn that watch and ring? 
A. I was there approximately a month. 
Q. A month. And if the pawn records indicated that you had 
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pawned that earlier in Seattle, they would be mistaken? 
A. I can't hear you. 
Q. If the pawn records from Seattle indicated you had pawned 
it earlier than that, they would be mistaken; is that correct? 
A. I believe not. I did pawn the ring, yes, and the watch. 
(R. 410-11); see Addendum D. 
The prosecutor did not introduce the pawn records into 
evidence. This series of questions, followed by the State's 
failure to present any evidence supporting the allegations 
contained in the questions, brought improper information to the 
juror's attention. 
The Supreme Court of Utah noted in State v. Emmett that this 
type of questioning generally constitutes error, see Emmett, 839 
P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992). In Emmett, the prosecutor 
repeatedly questioned the defendant whether he had rehearsed his 
testimony with his attorney, asking at one point, "He didn't tell 
you to face the jury and tell you exactly what to say?" Id. at 
786. (emphasis in original). The defendant denied the 
allegation, and the prosecutor presented no evidence to show that 
defense counsel had manufactured defendant's testimony. The 
court noted: "Generally, it is error to ask an accused a question 
that implies the existence of a prejudicial fact unless the 
prosecution can prove the existence of the fact. Otherwise, the 
only limit on such a line of questioning would be the 
prosecutor's imagination." .Id. at 786-87; see also United States 
v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 868 (10th Cir. 1984) (requiring 
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prosecutor who asks accused prejudicial fact to prove the fact); 
State v. Peterson, 722 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) 
(holding questioning about prior convictions after witness's 
denial improper without extrinsic proof of the convictions). 
This issue came before this court in State v. Palmer, 860 
P.2d 33 9 (Utah 1993). In Palmer, defendant was charged with 
aggravated assault of a child. The prosecutor asked defendant 
several times if he had made incriminating statements to the 
victim's stepfather and then did not introduce evidence 
demonstrating that assertion. The court concluded that these 
questions which implied inculpatory facts and were unsupported by 
evidence were error. 860 P.2d at 343. The court reserved 
analysis on the harmfulness of the error in order to consider it 
in conjunction with all of the other errors in the case. Id. 
The prosecutor's unsupported questions in the present case 
were also error, and were harmful because they affected the 
Appellant's character which was central to his defense. Further, 
the unsupported questions demonstrated that Appellant has a 
propensity to lie, thereby affecting his credibility, which, like 
Appellant's character, was central to his defense of both 
charges. 
B. The prosecutor's questions exceeded the scope of cross-
examination. 
In addition to being unsupported by any evidence, the 
prosecutor's questions regarding the pawning of the ring and 
watch which are set out above and in Addendum D exceeded the 
scope of direct examination. Utah R. Evid. 611(b) provides: 
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(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be 
limited to the subject matter of direct examination and matters 
affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the 
exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as 
if on direct examination. 
At no time on direct examination did defense counsel question 
Appellant as to what he did with the watch and ring given to him by 
Mrs. Davis in part exchange for the ring, nor did Appellant offer 
any information on this issue, (R. 375-402). Because Appellant was 
not questioned on direct examination to what he did with the watch 
and the ring, and because he volunteered no testimony to that 
matter on direct, the prosecutor's questions allowed the jurors to 
unjustifiably focus on the fact that Appellant pawned the ring and 
the watch. This error was harmful because it affected Appellant's 
credibility and character which, as discussed earlier, were at the 
heart of his defense. This could have reasonably affected the 
decision of the jury as to the decision to convict Appellant on the 
aggravated assault charge. 
C. The prosecutor asked Appellant to comment on the veracity of 
another witness. 
In the instant case, the prosecutor asked Appellant whether 
he disagreed with the testimony of Mrs. Davis on the issue of the 
origin of the ring. The questioning was as follows: 
Q. So it's your testimony now that you never told anybody on 
that occasion that the way you came into possession of this ring 
was that it came from your wife, your ex-wife, is that correct? 
That's what I'm hearing you say now. 
A I never said it came from my wife. 
Q. Did you ever say it came from your ex-wife? 
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A. No. 
Q. You heard the testimony, and vou disagree with that 
testimony; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 405, emphasis added); see Addendum D. 
In asking Appellant to assess the credibility of Mrs. Davis, 
the prosecutor drew to the juror's attention improper 
information. The Supreme Court of Utah said in Emmett that 
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 [s] everal courts have noted that it is improper to ask a 
criminal defendant to comment on the veracity of another 
witness." 839 P.2d at 787; see United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. 
Supp. 252, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Commonwealth v. Long, 462 
N.E.2d 330, 331-32, review denied, 465 N.E.2d 262 (1984), People 
v. Ellis, 462 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213-214 (1983). The Emmett court 
explained that such a question is improper "because it is 
argumentative and seeks information beyond the witness's 
competence." 83 9 P.2d at 787; see Narcisco, 446 F.Supp at 321; 
Long, 462 N.E.2d at 331-32, Ellis, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 213-14. The 
court said further that "[t]he prejudicial effect of such a 
question lies in the fact that it suggests to the jury that a 
witness is committing perjury even though there are other 
explanations for the inconsistency. In addition, it puts the 
defendant in the untenable position of commenting on the 
character and motivations of another witness who may appear 
sympathetic to the jury." 839 P.2d at 787; (citations omitted). 
In Emmett, the prosecutor asked the defendant if he was 
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claiming that his son was lying. The court found the question 
improper but that it was unnecessary to address how the question 
affected the trial since the court had previously decided to 
reverse for other errors. The court concluded that "we feel 
again compelled to note that prosecutors have a duty to eschew 
all improper tactics." 839 P.2d at 787; citing State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 557 (Utah 1987). 
The issue was also before this court in State v. Palmer, 860 
P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993). In Palmer, this court relied on 
Emmett to find that the prosecution's questions to the defendant 
asking him to comment on the veracity of other witnesses amounted 
to obvious error. 860 P.2d at 344. In cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked defendant to comment on the conflict between his 
testimony and that of two other witnesses. Relying on Emmett, 
the court found the questions to be argumentative and prejudicial 
because such questions suggest to the jury that the witness is 
committing perjury even though other explanations may exist for 
the inconsistencies. .Id. The court reserved analysis on the 
harmfulness of the error in order to consider it in conjunction 
with all of the other errors in the case. Id. 
This type of questioning in the instant case was error for 
the same reasons as the courts enunciated in both Emmett and 
Palmer. The questions brought improper matters to the juror's 
attention. Further, considered in conjunction with the other 
errors of the prosecution, this error was harmful because absent 
it, the jury could have reasonably returned with a more favorable 
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result for Appellant. 
Review of these issues is proper because they were plain 
error. "Plain error is error that is both harmful and obvious." 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785; see State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 
155, 158 (Utah 1989) (no obvious error because admission of 
evidence part of trial strategy); State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 
821 (Utah 1989)(applying plain error analysis to claims of 
prosecutor misconduct); see Utah R. Evid. 103(d). In Emmett, the 
Supreme Court of Utah said it reviews allegation of plain error 
despite a timely objection "in order to avoid manifest injustice 
and because, if the error is obvious, the trial court has the 
opportunity to address the error regardless of the fact that it 
was never brought to the court's attention." 839 P.2d at 785, 
(citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this g& day of March, 1994. 
/ M E T MILLER 
/^Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
) 
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ADDENDUM A 
n * i*« x , 9 vr CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265. 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328. 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §§ 5 to 7. 
CJ.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 5. 
AJLR. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A.LJL3d 301. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *» 
83(1), 121 to 123. 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
SJT.IL 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd SJS.), § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Prospective application. 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 PM 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms § 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law 
S 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons $ 2. 
AX.R. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *» 82; 
Weapons *» 1, 3, 6 et seq. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
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Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VH 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XTV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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76-6-401 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3. fecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4th 
C.J.S. — 77 CJ.S. Robbery § 28. 507. 




For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and 
birds, written instruments or other writings representing or embodying 
rights concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise 
containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility 
nature such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and 
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or tech-
nical information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which 
the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, 
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to 
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any 
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period 
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other 
compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces-
sarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or 
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and 
that is likley to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now be-
lieve to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his 
judgment in the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without dis-
closing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impedi-
160 
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-401 
ment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter 
of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not 
intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not 
intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-401. 
ANALYSIS 
Deception. 
Purpose to deprive. 
Cited. 
Deception. 
Subsection (a) in the definition of "decep-
tion" only applies to impressions of fact that 
are false at some present time; unfulfilled 
promises of future performance do not suffice 
as false representations under that subsection. 
State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Under Subsection (b) in the definition of "de-
ception." the previously created or confirmed 
impression of fact must be false when the prop-
erty is obtained in order to constitute "decep-
tion." State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1983). 
Under Subsection (e) in the definition of "de-
ception." a promise of future performance can 
constitute deception when the promising party 
does not intend to perform or knows the prom-
ise will not be performed; a person knows that 
a promise will not be performed when he is 
aware that the promise is reasonably certain 
not to be performed. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1983). 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's New Penal 
Code: theft. 1973 Utah L. Rev. 718. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 1. 
CJ.S. — 52A CJ.S. Larceny § 1(1). 
A.L.R. — Criminal liability for theft of, in-
terference with, or unauthorized use of, com-
puter programs, files, or systems, 51 A.L.R.4th 
971. 
Purpose to deprive. 
Evidence was sufficient to establish defen-
dant's intent to deprive owner of his automo-
bile where defendant drove the automobile in 
excess of 100 miles per hour when fleeing from 
police; told police when stopped that he owned 
the automobile; damaged the automobile by 
misuse; and drove the car from Utah to Califor-
nia without ever stating he would return the 
automobile to Utah. State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 
880 (Utah 1978). 
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was in-
ferred from the following facts: in 1984, defen-
dant began borrowing small amounts of money 
from the victim to buy pet food; the victim's 
generosity prompted defendant to make subse-
quent requests for larger sums to pay for ev-
erything from automobile repairs to medical 
bills; with each request, defendant inevitably 
promised to repay the victim soon or by a spe-
cific date; and between 1984 and 1986, defen-
dant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid only 
about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Cited in Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F. 
Supp. 376 (D. Utah 1986). 
Cat as subject of larceny, 55 A.L.R.4th 1080. 
What is "trade secret" so as to render action-
able under state law its use or disclosure by 
former employee, 59 A.L.R.4th 641. 
Key Numbers. — Larceny «=» 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-405 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements 
unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means 
an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications ad-
dressed to the public or to a class or group. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-405, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-405. 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Distribution of imitation controlled substance. 






"Purpose to deprive." 
Venue of offense. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
This section is not unconstitutionally vague 
or ambiguous; fact that auto salesman who 
knew that turning back an odometer was a 
crime assertedly relied upon the fact that for-
mer § 41-6-177 made such crime only a misde-
meanor did not preclude conviction of the 
salesman of theft by deception on basis of his 
having turned back the odometer. State v. 
Forshee, 588 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978). 
Distribution of imitation controlled sub-
stance. 
Where defendant distributed an imitation 
controlled substance in violation of § 58-37b-4, 
pursuant to § 58-37-19, which is applicable to 
offenses under Chapter 58-37b, defendant 
should have been charged with a violation of 
§ 58-37b-4, which specifically proscribed de-
fendant's conduct, rather than with theft by 
deception. State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 
1984). 
Elements of offense. 
For cases discussing elements of former of-
fense of obtaining money by false pretense, see 
State v. Howd, 55 Utah 527,188 P. 628 (1920); 
State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 P. 294 
(1927); State v. Jensen, 74 Utah 527, 280 P. 
1046 (1929); State v. Morris, 85 Utah 210, 38 
P.2d 1097 (1934); State v. Timmerman, 88 
Utah 481, 55 P.2d 1320 (1936); Ballaine v. Dis-
trict Court ex rel. Box Elder County, 107 Utah 
247, 153 P.2d 265 (1944); State v. Vatsis, 10 
Utah 2d 244, 351 P.2d 96 (1960); State v. 
Nuttall, 16 Utah 2d 171, 397 P.2d 797 (1964). 
Reliance by the victim is an element of the 
crime of theft by deception; even though the 
alleged victim is deceived, if he does not rely on 
the deception in parting with his property, 
there has been no theft by deception. State v. 
Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982). 
—Pecuniary loss. 
Evidence of pecuniary loss can be used to 
prove the elements of the crime of theft by de-
ception, although pecuniary loss is not an es-
sential element in itself. State v. Roberts, 711 
P.2d 235 (Utah 1985). 
Evidence. 
Evidence that defendant had signed name of 
alleged buyer of automobile to conditional 
sales contract which was purchased by finance 
company, and that automobile was subse-
quently sold to third person who paid cash sus-
tained conviction for obtaining money by false 
pretenses. State v. Vatsis, 10 Utah 2d 244, 351 
P.2d 96 (1960). 
Evidence was not sufficient to support be-
yond a reasonable doubt finding that buyer 
was reasonably certain that his promise to 
make a deposit into his checking account 
would not be performed, and was therefore in-
sufficient to support his conviction for theft by 
deception when his personal check for payment 
of the goods was returned for insufficient 
funds, where at time buyer gave seller the 
check he informed seller of the insufficient 
funds in the account; he requested seller not to 
cash the check that day; he informed seller 
that he had assurances from investors of immi-
nent cash investments which he would deposit 
to cover the check; the seller accepted the 
check on such terms; and the check was re-
turned for insufficient funds because the buyer 
did not receive the expected cash to make the 
deposit. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1983). 
169 
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Evidence held to be sufficient to establish 
the amount of funds embezzled by a theater 
manager. See State v. Patterson, 700 P.2d 1104 
(Utah 1985). 
In a prosecution for theft by deception, there 
was sufficient evidence that the defendant, 
who sold a mobile home under a lease-back ar-
rangement, then secured two loans using the 
same mobile home as collateral, without dis-
closing that title was encumbered, intended to 
deceive at the time of the transactions. State v. 
Noren, 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985). 
Forgery distinguished. 
Court properly ordered release of defendant 
who had pleaded guilty to crime of obtaining 
money or property by false pretenses, when in-
formation charged him with crime of forgery; 
former crime was not "necessarily included" in 
crime of forgery, although both crimes in-
cluded elements of fraud; forgery had to do 
with alteration or falsification of written in-
struments or documents, or use of unautho-
rized signatures, while false pretenses statute 
applied to wide range of activities related to 
property which might have in some instances 
involved forgery, but usually did not. Williams 
v. Turner, 421 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1970). 
Intent 
In a prosecution for theft by deception, the 
intent of the defendant at the time of taking 
the victim's money is determinative, and the 
fact that the defendant later enters an agree-
ment with the victim, appearing to negate any 
criminal intent, is immaterial. State v. 
Droddy, 702 P.2d 111 (Utah 1985). 
Jury instructions. 
Instructions referred to the intent required 
for commission of the offense but that did not 
inform the jury that before returning a verdict 
Utah Law Review. — Criminal and Civil 
Liability for Bad Checks in Utah, 1970 Utah L. 
Rev. 122. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 32 Am. Jur. 2d False Pre-
tenses § 1. 
C.J.S. — 35 C J.S. False Pretenses § 5. 
AX.R. — Attempts to commit offenses of 
larceny by trick, confidence game, false pre-
tenses, and the like, 6 A.L.R.3d 241. 
Criminal liability of corporation for extor-
of guilty they must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant had the conscious objec-
tive to withhold the property permanently was 
fatally defective. State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1980). 
Where defendant was charged with theft by 
deception, instruction to jury stating that they 
"may" employ a presumption that "the law pre-
sumes that a person intends the reasonable 
and ordinary consequences of his own act" vio-
lated defendant's constitutional right to due 
process of law because under the instruction 
given, the burden of persuasion on the element 
of intent, in the jury's mind, may have been 
shifted to the defendant. State v. Walton, 646 
P.2d 689 (Utah 1982). 
"Purpose to deprive." 
The defendant's "purpose to deprive" was in-
ferred from the following facts: in 1984, the 
defendant began borrowing small amounts of 
money from the victim to buy pet food; the vic-
tim's generosity prompted defendant to make 
subsequent requests for larger sums to pay for 
everything from automobile repairs to medical 
bills; with each request, defendant inevitably 
promised to repay the victim soon or by a spe-
cific date; and between 1984 and 1986, defen-
dant borrowed over $70,000 and repaid only 
about $1,500. State v. Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Venue of offense. 
District court had jurisdiction of offense of 
obtaining money by false pretense where both 
mispresentation and delivery of goods were ac-
complished in Utah. State v. Cobb, 13 Utah 2d 
376, 374 P.2d 844 (1962). 
Cited in State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
tion, false pretenses, or similar offenses, 49 
A.L.R.3d 820. 
Criminal liability in connection with appli-
cation for, or receipt of, public relief or welfare 
payments, 80 A.L.R.3d 1280. 
Key Numbers. — False Pretenses «=• 2. 
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Rule 30 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 364 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Rule 30. Errors and defects. 
Cross-References. — Arraignment, neces-
sity of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10. 
ANALYSIS 
Admission of photographic evidence. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Defendant's right of allocution. 
Harmless error. 
Minor defect. 
Substantial right affected. 
—State's burden of persuasion. 
Variances. 
Cited. 
Admission of photographic evidence. 
Even though admission of photographs of 
manslaughter victim served only to create 
emotional impact on jury, their admission was 
not reversible error, they were not so gruesome 
or offensive that their absence would have re-
sulted in a more favorable outcome for defen-
dant. State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979). 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Defendant's right of allocution. 
The defendant's due process right of allocu-
tion was satisfied at a sentencing hearing held 
in his presence, where he was addressed by the 
judge and elected to speak, and an amended 
judgment subsequently entered by the trial 
court, at which the defendant was not present 
nor represented by counsel, reflected only a 
correction of a clerical mistake in his sentence. 
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988). 
Harmless error. 
In prosecution for having carnal knowledge 
of female under age of 18 years, although it 
was error to allow prosecutrix to testify to acts 
of sexual intercourse after one relied on for 
conviction, such error was not prejudicial to 
defendant so as to require reversal. State v. 
Mattivi, 39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31 (1911). 
Where defendant in murder prosecution con-
tested every step taken by state during 
progress of trial and was afforded every oppor-
tunity to defend charge, and his counsel in-
sisted upon every right to which the law enti-
tled him, mere fact that defendant's plea of not 
guilty was received on legal holiday did not 
constitute prejudicial error. State v. Estes, 52 
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918). 
In a prosecution of a state fish and game 
warden for appropriating state money to his 
own use, an instruction in which the court read 
the entire statute on misuse of public money 
was erroneous, but since it did not prejudice 
rights of defendant, such error was diregarded. 
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968 
(1922). 
The admission of testimony at trial in viola-
*-*— -r j _ r — J „ „ « . ' „ A«««jtiHitiftnol mnfrnn tat inn 
Indictments and informations, harmless 
errors, U.R.CrJP. 4. 
rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
where such testimony was merely cumulative. 
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982). 
Trial court's instruction that flight from 
scene of crime of aggravated burglary 
amounted to implied admission of guilt was er-
roneous, but was not prejudicial, since there 
was other evidence sufficient to sustain a con-
viction. State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 
1983). 
The prosecutor's impermissible comment on 
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional 
right not to take the stand did not require re-
versal where the other evidence of guilt was 
convincing, defense counsel's prompt objections 
prevented the prosecutor from making any real 
point of the failure to testify, and the judge's 
quick and decisive admonition to the jury and 
prosecutor further obviated any harm that 
might have resulted from the comments. State 
v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985). 
Erroneous inclusion of intent to defraud an 
insurer in the information as comprising an 
element of aggravated arson was harmless 
error, where a correct instruction on the sub-
ject was later given to the jury immediately 
before their deliberations, to which no objec-
tion was taken. State v. Bergwerff, 777 P.2d 
510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Admission of defendant's prior offenses was 
harmless error as there was no reasonable like-
lihood of a more favorable result without the 
admission of the prior bad acts evidence. State 
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989). 
Minor defect 
Conviction for fornication would not be re-
versed because information charged defendant 
with having committed offense with one 
"Verda," whereas her name was Beatea, where 
identity of woman was sufficiently established. 
State v. Chipman, 40 Utah 549, 123 P. 89 
(1912). 
Substantial right affected. 
Court could not reverse judgment unless 
some substantial right of defendant had been 
invaded. State v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P. 
271 (1918). 
The verdict of a jury will not be upset on 
appeal merely because some error or irregular-
ity may have occurred, but will be overturned 
only if the error or irregularity is something 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its ab-
sence there would have been a different result. 
State v. Hutchinson. 655 P.2d 635 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Rule 17 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some perjog 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that WknJ 
the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the per 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connectedi 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or* 
specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to sep 
or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their &_ 
not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselvet'tj 
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that'it'ts 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instnip 
tions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been received Sf 
evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with him any iiqGSt 
of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by an^ 
other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept IJK 
gether in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Ex~ 
cept by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall nol 
fcllow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except tcr 
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the-
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations! 
or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed 
on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge 
of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then 
direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise 
the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be 
recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing 
without having the jury brought before the court, in which case the inquiry 
and the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out 
again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion 
of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information 
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not 
legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser in-
cluded offense. 
Cross-References. — Capital felony, pen-
alty, execution of penalty, §§ 76-3-206, 
76-3-207, 77-19-1 et seq. 
Fees, payment by state in criminal cases, 
§ 21-6-5. 
Husband and wife as witness for or against 
each other, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12; 
§§ 77-1-6, 78-24-8. 
Jurors and jury, § 78-46-1 et seq. 
Report of testimony of witness taken at pre-
liminary examination as admissible, Rule 7. 
Right to jury trial, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 
10, § 77-1-6. 
When judgment rendered, Rule 22. 
When verdict rendered, Rule 21 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
111, disabled, or disqualified jurors. 
—Agreement to proceed 








—Requests for further instructions. 
Absence of counsel. 
Absence of defendant. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
RULE 
101. Scope. 
102. Purpose and construction. 
103. Rulings on evidence. 
104. Preliminary questions. 
105. Limited admissibility. 
106. Remainder of or related writings or recorded 
statements. 
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS. 
301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and 
proceedings. 
302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and 
proceedings. 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS. 
401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
404. Character evidence not admissible to prove con-
duct; exceptions; other crimes. 
405. Methods of proving character. 
406. Habit; routine practice. 
407. Subsequent remedial measures. 
408. Compromise and offers to compromise. 
409. Payment of medical and similar expenses. 
410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and 
related statements. 
411. Liability insurance. 
412. [Reserved.] 
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES. 
501. Privileges recognized. 
502. Husband-wife. 
503. Communications to clergy. 
504. Lawyer-client. 
505. Government informer. 
506. Physician and psychotherapist-patient. 
507. Miscellaneous matters. 
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES. 
601. General rule of competency. 
602. Lack of personal knowledge. 
603. Oath or affirmation. 
604. Interpreters. 
605. Competency of judge as witness. 
606. Competency of juror as witness. 
607. Who may impeach. 
608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
610. Religious beliefs or opinions. 
611. Mode and order of interrogation and presenta-
tion. 
612. Writing used to refresh memory. 
613. Prior statements of witnesses. 
614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court. 
615. Exclusion of witnesses. 
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RULE 
702. Testimony by experts. 
703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts. 
704. Opinion on ultimate issue. 
705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert 
opinion. 
706. Court-appointed experts. 
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY. 
801. Definitions. 
802. Hearsay rule. 
803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial. 
804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
805. Hearsay within hearsay. 
806. Attacking and supporting credibility of declar-
ant. 
ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION. 
901. Requirement of authentication or identification. 
902. Self-authentication. 
903. Subscribing witness* testimony unnecessary. 




1002. Requirement of original. 
1003. Admissibility of duplicates. 
1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents. 
1005. Public records. 
1006. Summaries. 
1007. Testimony or written admission of party. 
1008. Functions of court and jury. 
ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS RULES. 
1101. Applicability of rules. 
1102. [Reserved.] 
1103. Title. 
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Rule 101. Scope. 
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this 
State, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in 
Rule 1101. 
Rule 102. Purpose and construction. 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense 
and delay, and promotion of growth and development 
of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may 
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
afifected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admit-
ting evidence, a timely objection or motion to 
strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was 
w —~~^ *** vi wicr ooa ruung. The court may 
add any other or further statement which shows the 
character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It 
may direct the making of an offer in question and 
answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings 
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to 
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested 
to the jury by any means, such as making statements 
or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of 
the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court. 
Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Pre-
liminary questions concerning the qualification of a 
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by 
the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). 
In making its determination it is not bound by the 
rules of evidence except those with respect to privi-
leges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact When the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of 
a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or 
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility 
of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of 
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other prelimi-
nary matters shall be so conducted when the interests 
of justice require, or when an accused is a witness and 
so requests. 
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, 
by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become sub-
ject to cross-examination as to other issues in the 
case. 
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not 
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury 
evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 105. Limited admissibility. 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party 
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another 
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, 
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or 
recorded statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part 
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party 
may require the introduction at that time of any 
other part or any other writing or recorded statement 
which ought in fairness to be considered contempora-
neously with it. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE n. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial 
notice of fldinHinativ* fo<*+c 
and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judi-
cial notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the 
necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled 
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as 
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor 
of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notifica-
tion, the request may be made after judicial notice 
has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceed-
ing, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as con-
clusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, 
the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not 
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially 
noticed. 
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS. 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil ac-
tions and proceedings. 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not 
otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a 
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence 
of the presumed fact is more probable than its exis-
tence. 
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions 
are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is 
founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If 
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither 
presumption applies. 
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil ac-
tions and proceedings. 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a pre-
sumption respecting a fact which is an element of a 
claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the 
rule of decision is determined in accordance with fed-
eral law. 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS 
LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissi-
ble; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as oth-
erwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, stat-
ute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in 
courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or 
521 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 611 
(1922) (referred to in Committee Note); 
B v Green, 578 P.2d 512 (Utah 1978); 
B v Hubbard, 601 P.2d 929 (Utah 1979); 
* v Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986); 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal 
L§w. 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137. 
Green v. Bock Laundry — Federal Rule 
609<a)<l) in Civil Cases: The Supreme Court 
Takes an Imbalanced Approach, 1990 Utah L. 
R*v. 613. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses 
f 569 et seq. 
CJ.S. — 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507. 
A.L.R. — Permissibility of impeaching cred-
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and restates the in-
herent power of the court to control the judicial 
Process. Cf. Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 
210. 461 P.2d 56 (1969). There was no compa-
tible provision to Subsection (b) in Utah Rules 
tf Evidence (1971), but it is comparable to cur-
rent Utah case law and practice. Degnan, Non-
ANALYSIS 
Cross-examination. 
Exclusion of witnesses. 
Leading questions. 
Cross-examination. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 
(Utah 1989). 
ibility of witness by showing former conviction 
as affected by pendency of appeal from convic-
tion or motion for new trial, 16 A.L.R.3d 726. 
Propriety, on impeaching credibility of wit-
ness in civil case by showing former conviction, 
of questions relating to nature and extent of 
punishment, 67 A.L.R.3d 761. 
Right to impeach credibility of accused by 
showing prior conviction as affected by remote-
ness in time of prior offense, 67 A.L.R.3d 824. 
Key Numbers. — Witnesses •» 345. 
Rules Evidence Law: Cross-Examination, 6 
Utah L. Rev. 323 (1959). Subsection (c) is com-
parable to current Utah practice. Cf. Rule 
43(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
control of cross-examination by defense coun-
sel. See Vanderpool v. Hargis, 23 Utah 2d 210, 
461 P.2d 56 (1969). 
The latitude that may be allowed in cross-
examination is largely within the discretion of 
the trial court, to be exercised and governed by 
the facts and circumstances of each particular 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 610. Religious beliefs or opinions. 
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not 
admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the 
witness* credibility is impaired or enhanced. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is basis of incompetency as a witness, Utah 
Che federal rule, verbatim, and is in accord Const., Art. I, Sec. 4. 
with Rule 20 [Rule 30], Utah Rules of Evidence Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
(1971). ment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this 
Cross-References. — Religious belief not rule to make the language gender-neutral. 
Rule 611. Mode and order of interrogation and presenta-
tion. 
(a) Control by court The court shall exercise reasonable control over the 
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) 
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the 
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment. 
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to 
the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credi-
bility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit 
inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. 
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct 
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' 
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-exami-
nation. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness 
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ADDENDUM B 
II you want to step back and hand them to the baliffs at the 
2 1 front door, feel free to do so. If you do mail them in, 
3 J write your name at the bottom, and indicate you were a 
4 J juror so I know who they came from. And then I can see 
5 1 they are administratively dismissed. If there's nothing 
6 1 else I'm going to dismiss the jury at this time. 
7 MS. REMAL: Nothing else. 
8 1 THE COURT: Thank you all very much, ladies 
9 1 and gentlemen. Please have a nice day. 
101 MR. MORGAN: Your Honor, before we proceed 
111 with your ruling, perhaps I may be able to save that 
12 1 judicial time. One moment. 
13 J THE COURT: I suppose the reason I took this 
14I under advisement as to count one was my concern at the 
15 I time that — I thought the jury would let me off the 
16 1 hook, and they didnft. I think my concern went perhaps 
17 I more to weight than actually being able to determine as a 
18 J matter of law that reasonable minds could not differ on 
19 1 the sufficiency of the evidence in this case. And while 
20I I still have concerns about the strength of the State's 
211 case primarily on the basis of intent as far as Mr. 
22 1 Taylor's concerned, I in all honesty do not feel that I 
23I would be acting appropriately if I said that as a matter 
24 J of law, reasonable minds could not differ with regard to 
25 1 the question of intent. I believe it's possible that 
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II reasonable minds can differ, and I think it's a question 
2I of proof in my own view of the evidence in particularly 
3 1 the state of mind of Mr. Taylor when he first went in 
4 1 Fankhauser Jewelry, and I suppose thatfs basis upon the 
5 1 after events, but those are traditionally matters for a 
6 1 trier of fact, and not a matter for the Court to rule on 
7I as a matter of law. So while I then and still do have 
8 J some serious concerns about the strength of the State • s 
9 1 case, I'm not willing to say as a matter of law that it 
10 1 must fail. Therefore, the motion is denied. All right. 
Ill Having granted a mistrial in this matter, what I am going 
12 1 to do is this: Is there any reason I ought not to 
13 J proceed to sentence on the third degree felony? 
14 1 MR. MORGAN: No reason known to the State. 
15 1 MR. REMAL: None that I know, Your Honor. 
16 1 THE COURT: Let's set the matter down for 
17 1 sentencing. October 29th, Evelyn? 
18 THE CLERK: Yes. 
19 1 THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, you have a right to 
20 1 be sentenced not earlier than two, no more than thirty 
211 days from today1s date. Ms. Remal, would it be 
22I appropriate to get a pre-sentence report? 
23 MR. REMAL: I believe it would be. 
24 THE COURT: I111 set the matter for the 29th 
25 1 of October at nine ofclock for sentencing. I111 refer 
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ADDENDUM C 
2 J work, and he needed money. 
2J Q. So he indicated he was familiar with that 
3 I particular — 
4 A. Yes. He said it belonged to his wife. 
5 I Q. Did he say anything else about the origin of 
6 I that diamond? 
7 J A. No. 
8| Q. Now, you indicated that you tested it with a 
9 J diamond tester. You've been kind enough to bring that 
10 I diamond tester today? 
Ill A. Yes. 
12i Q. Would you take it out of your little bag 
13 there? 
14I A. Yes. 
15 MR. MORGAN: May we show that to the jury? I 
16 don't think we want to enter it into evidence. Use it 
17I for demonstrative purposes. 
18 THE COURT: Defendant have any objection? 
19 1 MS. REMAL: I don't have any objection, as 
20 long as Mr. Taylor and I can move so we can see the 
21J demonstration. 
22 1 THE WITNESS: It's blinking now, and once it 
23 1 stops and says ready, then it's ready to be used. 
24 MR. MORGAN: Mind if we show it to counsel 
25 and the jury? 
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x THE WITNESS: No, that's fine 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, just stand right back 
3 I there by your counsel. 
4 MR. MORGAN: I'd just like to show it to the 
5 jury. 
6 J THE COURT: Pass it around, let them take a 
7 look at it. 
8 Q. (By Mr. Morgan) You indicated that the 
9| light is blinking right now. What does that mean? 
10I A. That it's getting ready. It's heating up. 
11 Q. We just heard a beep. What does that mean? 
12 A: Did you touch your diamond?. 
13 1 Q. I donft have a diamond. 
14| A. Oh, the beep meant that it was ready. Isn't 
15 it just — not blinking any more? 
16 1 Q. And the red light will stay on when it's 
17 J ready to test? 
18I A. Yes. Until you touch something with it. 
19 Q. Based upon your training and experience, 
20 1 you've indicated that you do have a diamond on your hand; 
211 is that correct? 
22 1 A. Yes. Uh huh (affirmative). 
23 Q. What size of diamond is that? 
24 A. 2.11 karats. 
25 Q. That's a big one? 
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1 A. Uh huh (affirmative)• 
2 Q. Would you test for the jury to show them what 
3 J it sounds like? Now, I'll give you your diamond back. 
4I THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, stand back over here 
5 1 behind your attorney, please. 
6 1 Q. (By Mr. Morgan) Now, we just heard a beep? 
7 A. The green light comes on and says diamond. 
8 Q. What does that mean? 
9 1 A. That it is a diamond. 
10 1 Q. Now, we're going to have to allow it to 
111 recharge again, and that will turn red again, and you111 
12 1 hear a little beep, and you1re now going to test the item 
13 I that was represented as a diamond by the defendant; is 
14 J that correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. State's Exhibit 1? 
171 A. I can touch mine again. 
18 1 Q. Now you're touching your's again? 
19 A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
20 1 Q. And it's beeping and turning green? 
211 A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
22 J Q. It did not beep or turn green on the 
23 1 defendant's; is that right? 
24 A. No. 
25 1 Q. This is the kind of test you conducted? 
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I) A. Yes. 
2 Q. You checked it twice? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 J Q. You realize now it was not a diamond. And 
5 J based upon its color, and its size, you concluded it was 
6 a cubic zirconium? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. The defendant returned later that day? 
9 A. Yes. He came back about 1:30. 
10 Q. And who was present at that time? 
Ill A. My daughter Linda, myself, and my husband, 
12 Gary. 
13 Q. And did the defendant approach you again at 
14 that time? 
15 A. Yes. He came in, and said that the hands on 
16 the watch were not lined up. In other words, at twelve 
17 1 o'clock, both hands should be on top of each other, the 
18 1 hour hand was off so that — he didn't say how far off, 
19 1 but I know what he meant. Instead of being twelve 
20 J o'clock, maybe the hour hand was on 1, between 1 and 12, 
21j to indicate that the hands weren't lined up. 
22 Q. And at that time, did you confront him with 
23 J your discovery that it was a cubic zirconium? 
24 1 A. Yes. My daughter, Linda, told — 
25 1 Q. Did you confront him? 
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ADDENDUM D 
11 zirconium or a real diamond? 
2I A. No, I did not. 
3 1 Q. Did you at any time on June 21st, 1993 try to 
4 J hit Linda Davis with your car? 
5 1 A. No. 
6 1 MS. REMAL: I don't have anything further 
7 1 questions, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Morgan? 
9 CROSS EXAMINATION 
10 1 By Mr. Morgan: 
111 Q. You testified that you found this in a dryer 
12 1 two days before the incident; is that correct? 
13I A. It was not in a dryer; it was in a washing 
14I machine. 
15 Q. 
16 I A. 
17 Q. 
18 I A. 
19 Q. 
20 1 store? 
211 A. I found it Sunday morning after I took my 
22 J wash out of the machine. 
23 Q. Do you understand what I'm asking you? Did 
24 J you find it two days before? 
25 A. No. 
You found it two days prior; is that correct? 
No. It was on Sunday morning. 
You found it? 
Yes. 
Before you are took it into the jewelry 
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Q. Did you find it before you went into the 
jewelry store? Yes or no? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was not your property; is that correct? 
A. No, it wasn't. 
Q. This is somebody elsefs property, no matter 
what it is, when you walked into the jewelry store; isn't 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. When you went in there, you sold 
it as if it were your own; is that correct? 
A. I wanted to find out if it was real first. 
Q. I understand. My question, however, was when 
you made the transaction, you sold it, and represented to 
them that this was your own; isn't that correct? No 
matter what it was? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you misrepresented by your own testimony 
where you got this ring and who owned it? 
A. Can you define that a little bit for me? 
Q. Yes. To misrepresent means to lie. You lied 
to them about whether or not you owned this ring or not, 
didn't you? 
A. I made no statement to them. I brought it in 
to have it appraised. 
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ll Q. It was a lie when you sold this ring to them 
2I as your own, wasn•t it? 
3 1 A. I don't think it was quite a lie. 
4 1 Q. What do you think it quite was? 
5I A. I think what I should have done was do some 
6I more research. 
7 I Q. When you walked in there, and you 
8I misrepresented that it was your own property, you told 
9I them that it belonged to your wife, or your ex-wife; 
10 isn't that true? 
Ill A. I never said I had a wife. 
12 Q. You didn't? 
13 A. No, I didn't. 
14 1 Q. You are divorced, aren't you? 
15 A. Say what? 
16 J Q. You're divorced, aren't you? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 I Q. And you were divorced on June 21st, 1993, 
19 1 weren't you? 
201 A. Yes. 
211 Q. So you did have an ex-wife? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 1 Q. And so it's very reasonable to assume that 
24 I you did tell them that this belonged to your ex-wife; is 
25 that correct. 
Page 
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ll MS. REMAL: I object to the form of the 
2 I question. I think he can ask what he did or didn't say. 
3 1 MR. MORGAN: I withdraw the question. 
4 THE COURT: Very well. 
5 1 Q. (By Mr. Morgan) So it's your testimony now 
6 J that you never told anybody on that occasion that the way 
7 J you came into possession of this ring was that it came 
8l from your wife, your ex-wife; is that correct? That's 
9 what I'm hearing you say you now. 
10 I A. I never said it came from my wife. 
Ill Q. Did you ever say it came from your ex-wife? 
12 A. No. 
13 J Q. You heard the testimony, and you disagree 
14 J with that testimony; is that correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 I Q. Nobody ever asked you where you got the ring? 
17 1 A. Yes, she did. 
18 1 Q. And how did you respond when you were asked? 
19| A. I didn't respond. 
20 1 THE COURT: He said he didn't respond. 
2ll Q. You didn't respond. They didn't ask you — 
22 1 when you didn't respond to them asking you where you got 
23 the ring, did that surprise you? 
24 I A. Ms. Davis was making the assumption that it 
25i was my ex-wife's. 
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1 Q. Why would she make that assumption? 
2 1 A. Possibly because it's a woman's ring. 
3i Q. Were you wearing a wedding ring? 
4 A. No. 
5 1 Q. Are you wearing a wedding ring today? 
6 A. No. 
7 1 Q. So why would one assume that it came from 
8 1 someone to whom you've been married? 
9 1 A. I don't know. 
10 I Q. That would not be a reasonable assumption in 
111 your opinion, would it? 
12 I A. Could you — I can't hear very well. I'm 
13 I sorry. Could you come up closer? 
14 1 Q. You indicated — this is as close as I want 
15 1 to get. If you can't hear me, I'll repeat the question. 
16 I You indicated that you believed that Mrs. Davis, Miriam 
17 1 Davis assumed this came from your ex-wife; is that 
18I correct? 
19I Or your wife? 
20 1 A. That's what she said, yes. 
21 Q. When did she say that? 
22 A. After I asked her if she'd appraise it. 
23 Q. So she said this came from your ex-wife, and 
24 J again, did you respond to that statement? 
25 A. I didn't really say anything, no. 
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1 Q. Didnft it surprise you that she never 
2 questioned your failing to tell her where the ring came 
3 from? 
4I MR. REMAL: Your Honor, I object. I don't 
5 I think it • s relevant whether it surprised him or not what 
6 Ms. Davis was thinking. 
7 1 THE COURT: Overruled. 
8 Q. (By Mr. Morgan) Did it surprise you that 
9 J she did not question your failure to tell her where this 
10I ring came from? 
Ill A. To be honest with you, she was more eager to 
12 J find out if the ring was real or not. 
13 J Q. And you were willing to let her just take the 
14 J ring no matter what; is that correct? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Were you eager to sell this ring? 
17 1 A* I wanted to find out its true value, yes. 
18 I Q. Were you eager to sell the ring? 
19 1 A. Not necessarily, no. 
20 I Q. Were you employed on June 21st, 1993 in the 
21 State of Utah? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 1 Q. What were you doing for a living? 
24 1 A. Working. 
25 1 Q. Where were you working? 
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II A. Subcontractor• 
2 1 Q. For whom were you subcontracting? 
3 1 A. His name is Cal. I was working up in Park 
4I City at the time. 
5 1 Q. What's Cal's last name? 
6 J A. To be honest with you, Ifd have to get the 
7 1 phonebook and get it out for you. I worked for him for 
8 J one week. 
9 1 Q. And during that one week period, how much did 
10I you earn? 
11 A. About $150.00. 
12 1 Q. With that $150.00 over the one week period, 
13 I did you have any money in your pocket when you walked in 
14 there? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. How much money did you have in your pocket? 
17 A. I had several hundred dollars. Can we back 
18 up a little bit? 
19 1 Q. Sure. You're about to tell me where you got 
20 the several hundred dollars from. 
2l| A. I was working for Intermountain Temporary. I 
22 1 had been working for them for over a year. 
23 I Q. Those are for people who don't have continued 
24 J employment; is that correct? 
25 I A. I don't work for them any more, no. 
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1 Q. Maybe I didn't make that clear. You didn't 
2 J have a regular job, did you? 
3j A. I was working through a temporary service, 
4 yes. 
5 1 Q. And that is not a regular job, is it? 
6 1 A. It's work. 
7 J Q. Needed money, didn't you? 
8I A. No. 
9 1 Q. You were eager to sell this ring because you 
10 J needed money? 
11 A. Can we back up a little bit? 
12 1 THE COURT: No. Is that a question, or a 
13 statement? 
14 1 MR. MORGAN: It was a question, Your Honor. I 
15 I think it's best just to move on. 
16 1 Q. (By Mr. Morgan) Now, when was the last 
17I time you got paid? 
181 A. Friday. 
19 1 Q. Did you expect to go to work the following 
20 1 Monday? 
21 A. I also worked during the weekends detailing 
22 J semi trucks. 
23 Q. I see. For whom did you work detailing semi 
24 trucks? 
251 A. Just independent owners. 
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11 Q. And you would have to look in the phone book 
2 J to find their names as well? 
3 J A. No, I'd go to the truckstops. 
4 1 Q. And did you expect to work that week? 
5 1 A. It was — yes. 
6 1 Q. And you expected to continue working in 
7 construction as a subcontractor up in Park City as well; 
8 J is that correct? 
9 A. I worked up there with this person for one 
10 1 week. That was the term of the job. Yes. 
Ill Q. So that job was over? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 I Q. But you did intend to stay in the valley, and 
14 J continue working; is that correct? 
15 A, Yes. 
16 1 Q. But despite that, you immediately left for 
17 I Washington after you had had this confrontation in the 
18 parking lot; is that correct? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. You didn't immediately go back to Washington 
21 and pawn the ring and the watch in Seattle, Washington? 
22 I Is that what you're saying here today under oath? 
23 1 A. I didn't go back immediately. 
24 I Q. Well, how long did it take you to go back to 
25 Washington and pawn that watch and ring? 
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I was there approximately a month. 
A month. And if the pawn records indicated 





I can't hear you. 
If the pawn records from Seattle indicated I 





















is that correct? I 
I believe not. I did pawn the ring, yes, and I 
• 1 
You had another ring with you at the time J 
went into the jewelry store? J 
Yes. 
Where did you get this ring? J 
It was given to me by my mother. 1 
It was given to you by the — J 
Mother. J 
The mother of whom? 1 
Me. 
Your mother? 1 
Yes. 
And that ring is where today? J 
It's back in Washington. 1 
Where in Washington? 1 
It should be in my car if it's still there. I 
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You never pawned that ring? 
No. 
You have never tried to sell that ring? 
No. 
But you had that appraised? 
Yes. 
If you weren't going to sell it, why did you 
ring appraised? 
It had some sentimental value to me. I 
know. My mother — she gave my brother a ring 
too, which is worth, I don't know, probably right around 
$3,000. She's probably not going to be around much 
longer. 
Q. The stones that were in that ring, it's your 
testimony that Mrs. Davis told you that they were 
zircons? 
A. (Witness nods affirmatively). 
THE COURT: You need to answer audibly. You 
need to say yes or no, sir. 
Q. (By Mr. Morgan) Was that a yes? 
A. I — 
Q. Did Mrs. Davis tell you that the stones in 
the ring that you've identified as coming from your 
mother, that they were zircons? Is that your testimony? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. That's what you told them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And she looked at those under a glass to 
determine whether or not they were zircons? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you indicated that your brother has a 
similar ring that you believe is worth $3,000; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you had never heard of zircons until 
after this incident? 
A. I've seen them on TV before, yes. 
Q. Now, when you were told that the stones in 
the smaller ring were zircons, then what did you 
understand the value of that ring to be? 
A. She told me it was worth, I don't know, maybe 
fifty — $60.00. 
Q. And that would be considerably less than the 
value of a similar ring belonging to your brother would 
be; is that correct? 
A. The ring my brother has that my mother gave 
to him has two rubies in it, and I think four diamonds. 
Q. And so you did understant the difference of 
the value between a Zircon and a diamond at that time, 
didn't you? 
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1 A. I didn't know if it was real or not. 
2 1 Q. And you didnft know this ring was real or not 
3 1 at that time; isn't that correct? 
4I A. Yes. 
5 1 Q. You did know, or you didn't know? 
6| A. I didn't know. 
7 1 Q. And you went in there because you did not 
8 1 know the ring was real or not, and that's why you wanted 
9 J it appraised, isn't that what you testified to? 
10 1 A. I wanted to find out if it was real or not, 
111 yes. 
12 J Q. So you did not know at the time that the ring 
13I was real or not when you asked to have it appraised is 
14 your version? 
15 A. No. 
16 1 Q. Therefore, if you represented that it was a 
17 1 diamond, that would not be the truth? 
18 A. I thought if somebody was going to give that 
19j much merchandise, that it must have been real. 
20 I Q. Under your version, it is Mrs. Davis who 
211 suggested that it was a diamond, and not you; is that 
22 J correct? 
23| A. I said — as far as I knew, it was. 
24 J Q. You never represented that it was a diamond 
25 I when you initially made the trade? That is that your 
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11 testimony? 
2 1 A. As far as I knew, it was. 
3 1 Q. Do you know what the word represent means? 
4I A. Yes. 
5 1 Q. Did you ever represent at the time the 
6 transaction was made that this was a diamond? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 1 Q. So you did tell them that it was a diamond 
9I even though you did not know? 
10 I A. After I went through the transaction with 
111 her, yes. As far as I knew, I believed it was. 
12 J Q. So when you came back later that day, and you 
13 J kept insisting it was a diamond, what had changed your 
14 mind? 
15 J A. When you — could you speak towards me? Ifm 
16 1 having a real hard time hearing. 
17 1 Q. Ifll speak louder. When you returned to the 
18 J store later that day, and you insisted that it was a 
19 J diamond, what had changed your mind? 
20 1 A. I donft quite understand you. 
211 Q. Let's break it down into pieces. Did you 
22I return later that day to get the hands on the watch 
23 J fixed, or to get the watch fixed? 
24I A. Yes. 
25 Q. When you returned, did they tell you that it 
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11 was a cubic zirconium? 
2 1 A. Yes. 
3 1 Q. Did you nonetheless insist that it was a 
4 J diamond? 
51 A. I believed it was, yes. 
6 1 Q. Did you tell them that it was a diamond? 
7 1 A. I may have, yes. 
8 Q. Don•t you remember? 
9 1 A. I may have, yes. 
10 1 Q. Do you remember telling them that it was a 
11J diamond at that time? 
12 J A. After she — I was still going on the basics 
13 J what I learned before. 
14 1 Q. I understand. Did you tell them that it was 
15I a diamond? 
16 J A. I donft — explain to me. Can you break it 
17I down? 
18 1 Q. Yes. Did you tell Mrs. Davis that it was a 
19 J diamond? 
20I A. I may have, yes. 
21J Q. When you say you may have, does that mean you 
22 1 don't remember? 
23 A. I may have, yes. Yeah. 
24 I Q. Do you remember telling them it was a 
25I diamond? 
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1 A. Yes. 
1 Q. Thank you. So you did tell them it was a 
diamond? When you walked in, you didn't think it was a 
diamond, or you didn't know? 
A. I didn't know if it was or not. 
Q. What changed between the time that you let 
them tell you it was a diamond, and when you went in and 
told them it was a diamond? 
A. Can you break this down for me? 
Q. Did anything change between the time that you 
left and when you came back that caused you to believe 
that it was a diamond? 
A. As far as I knew, I felt it was. 
Q. You had your Washington ID with you when you 
came to Utah? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you weren't in Utah for very long; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. I have been. 
Q. Did you get a Utah driver's license? 
A. No. 
Q. Showing you what's been marked as State's 
Exhibit 9, does that appear to be the record of your 
driver's license in Washington? 
A. Yes. 
Page 147 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
00417 
II Q. That's the information that you have on your 
2 1 driver's license card; is that correct? 
3 I A. Yes. 
4 1 Q. Is that your picture as it appeared on June 
5 21st, 1993? 
6 A. Yes. 
71 Q. That is your signature? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 1 Q. That is your identification number as well; 
10 J is that correct? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 1 Q.' Now, did you have any other identification 
13 J with you at that time? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 1 Q. What other identification did you have? 
16 1 A. Several bank cards, social security card, 
17j veteran's card, and a check cashing card. 
18 1 Q. All of those forms of identification are in 
19 1 the name of Dale Taylor; is that correct? 
20 1 A. Yes. 
211 Q. When she offered to give you a check in 
22 J exchange for this ring, she asked you your name? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 1 Q. And you gave her the name Dale Taylor? 
25 A. Yes, I did. 
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1 Q* If you had given her any other name, could 
2 you have cashed that check? 
3 A. No. 
4 I Q. Do you remember the instructions from Mrs. 
5 J Davis telling you that there would not be money in the 
6 J account until tomorrow; is that correct? 
7 1 A. She said that she had to make a deposit later 
8 I that afternoon, or the next morning. 
9 1 Q. And she asked you to wait; is that correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
Ill Q. But you didn't wait, did you? 
12 A. No, I didnft. 
13 I Q. Why didn't you wait? 
14 1 A. I wanted to see if the check was good. 
15 1 Q. Once you found out the check was good, and 
16 1 there was money in the account, why didnft you wait? 
17 I A. If it would have been post-dated, I would 
18 1 have. 
19 1 Q. Did you think it might inconvenience her to 
20 1 have her checks bouncing because you took the check out 
211 before she said that you could? 
22j A. I did not force this woman to write a check. 
23 I Q. Now, you forced her to give you a ring, and 
24 I you forced her to give you a watch in return for your 
25 1 representation that this is a diamond, when you knew that 
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II it was a Zircon; isn't that correct. 
2 MR. REMAL: Your Honor, I object to the form 
3 1 of the question. There's no evidence of forcing her. 
4 1 THE COURT: Sustained. 
5 1 Q. (By Mr. Morgan) You caused her to do those 
6 J things? 
7 1 A. I did not force this woman to do anything. 
8 1 Q. You didn't use physical force? 
9 1 A. No. 
10 J Q. You used deception, didn't you? 
11 A. No. 
12 1 Q. You didn't ask for a receipt, did you? 
13 1 A. I figured I should have been given one, yes. 
14 J Q. Did you ask for one? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Why not? 
17 J A. I don't know. I figured this was just 
18 1 business practice. 
19 1 Q. It's good business practice to not ask for a 
20 1 receipt? 
211 A. She was the one that was giving me the 
22 1 materials. It was her responsibility to give me the 
23 J receipt. 
24 I Q. And you did not ask for one? 
25 1 A. I didn't even think of it at the time. 
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1 Q. She must have gotten those injuries from 
2 something else other than that; wouldnft you agree? 
3 I A. To be honest with you, I didn't see any 
4 1 injuries on this woman at that time. 
5 1 Q. So those injuries must have come from 
6 something other than the confrontation with you? 
7 A. I don't know. 
81 Q. Did those injuries come from the 
9I confrontation with you or not? 
10 J MR. REMAL: Your Honor, I think he's asking 
11 for — 
12 THE COURT: Sustained. He said, I don't 
13 know. 
14 THE WITNESS: To be honest with you, I 
15 1 didn't see any injuries on her at that time. 
16 Q. (By Mr. Morgan) You indicated that you 
17 J believed that Mrs. Davis had switched the stones on you. 
18 I Do you recall that when you testified on direct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. What led you to believe that she had switched 
211 the stones on you? 
22 1 A. It just didn't make sense to me that somebody 
23 J would give this type of merchandise, and then come back 
24 three hours later, and say it was not real without 
25 I testing it fully. 
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Q. So it's her fault she didn't test it? 
A. If all this would have been tested and done 
the proper way, none of this would have actually ever 
happened. 
You've never returned the diamond ring? 
I would have taken it to the police, yes. 
You never returned the watch? 
No. 











And you believe you're entitled to that? 
It seems like there's a big misunderstanding 
in the whole deal. 
Q. There was a misunderstanding at the point 
where you returned, and they said, let's talk about this, 
wasn't there, sir? 
A. I didn't know what to think at the time. 
Q. So you did not understand — in your mind, 
they did not understand, and that's pretty much a 
misunderstanding; is it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, when you left, why didn't you just wait 
for the police, or call the police yourself? 
A. I don't know. 
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l| Q. Didnft you testify that you believed they had 
2I switched the ring? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 1 Q. If somebody had switched a $3,000 diamond 
5 ring, don't you think that's a fraud? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 1 Q. That's a crime, because somebody deceived 
8 1 you, if that had taken place; isn't that correct? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 J Q. If somebody had taken a ring, and said that 
11J it was a diamond to cheat you out of the — if somebody 
12 J had taken the ring, and said it was a zirconium to cheat 
13 J you out of your rightful money for the diamond, that 
14 1 would be a deception, and that would be a crime; is that 
15 J correct? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 1 Q. But the other way around, you don't think 
18| it's a crime when you take a ring that is not yours, that 
19i you represent is a diamond, that you don't know whether 
20 1 or not it's a diamond or not, and you give that to 
211 someone, and they give you money for it, and even after 
22 1 you find out for sure that it's a cubic zirconium, that 
23 J in your mind is not a crime, because Mrs. Davis should 
24 J have checked it? Is that your belief? 
25 1 A. I believe that things should have been a lot 
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11 more thouroughly gone through. 
2 Q. Do you think the police could have helped in 
3 this situation? 
4 A. In pertaining — 
5 I Q. By the police coming down, and just 
6 J straightening things out, maybe taking the ring, taking 
7 I the report, seeing if it had been switched, maybe 
8 checking to see if there was a loose one karat diamond in 
9I the back room? 
10 A. I don't know if they did or didn't. 
Ill Q. You could have called — you could have done 
12 1 something about it, but you didn't. You fled, didn't 
13 you? 
14 1 A. I did leave, yes. 
15 1 Q. You were in a hurry when you left? 
16 1 A. Not necessarily, no. 
17 I Q. Used physical force so you could leave. You 
18 1 didn't want to stay there, did you? 
19 J A. I didn't want to stay there, yes. 
20 1 Q. And you immediately left for Washington? 
21 A. No, I didn't. 
22 J Q. Did you go to the police? 
23 A. Huh? 
24 I Q. Once you had cooled down, did you go to the 
25 police? 
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11 THE COURT: Mr. Morgan, you've asked this 
2I about three times. 
3 1 MR. MORGAN: I'm done. Let me check my 
4 1 notes. One last thing, Your Honor. I promise I'll be 
5I done• 
6 1 Q. (By Mr. Morgan) You asked them to fix your 
7 1 watch when you returned the second time; is that -correct? 
8 1 A. Yes. 
9 1 Q. And you indicated that nobody responded to 
10 your request; is that correct? 
Ill A. I don * t remember. 
12 1 Q. You didn't — if you did testify that they 
13 didn't really respond, then you're not sure about that? 
14 They may have responded; might not have? 
15 1 A. I don't think anything was said right at the 
16 1 moment, no. 
17 1 Q. All right. So they responded, they may have 
18 J responded, may not have responded? 
19 J A. They said they wanted the ring and the check 
2 0 J and the money, yes. 
2l| Q. You have a pretty good memory when it comes 
22 1 down to things that support your version. What's causing 
23 the problems with your memory that support their version? 
24 MR. REMAL: Your Honor, I'd object. 
251 THE COURT: Objection sustained. 
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1 MR. MORGAN: No further questions. 
2 THE COURT: Redirect? 
3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 1 By Ms. Remal: 
5 J Q. Dale, let's just try to review some of this. 
6 1 When you went to the store the first time to the jewelry 
7 1 store with the ring that's now Exhibit No. 1, did you 
8 J know what the stone was that was in that ring? 
9 A. No. 
10I Q. And was there anything that happened during 
111 that first time you were at the store that made you 
12 J believe it was a diamond? 
13 I A. The way they were looking at it through their 
14 1 optics, and I was going on their expertise. 
15 1 Q. And when you left the store that first time 
16| with the check for $1,275 I think it is, and the watch, 
17 1 and the other ring, which you had received in trade for 
18 J the ring you brought in, did you at that moment believe 
19 1 that the ring you'd brought in had a diamond, and not a 
20 1 zirconium in that ring? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 I Q. And when you returned two or three hours 
23 J later with the problem with the watch, did you still 
24 I believe that that was a diamond based on what had 
25 happened the first time you were there? 
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